The "Coase theorem" is made of the efficiency and the neutrality theses. Using cooperative game theory, we show that these two theses are not compatible: there exist only two types of rights assignments that guarantee a nonempty core. Thus, the efficiency thesis holdsthere exist (two types of) rights assignments under which the core of the game is nonempty -but the neutrality thesis does not hold -for all other rights assignments the core is empty. This complements the results found in the literature on Coase and the core. Our paper also adds two more results. Indeed, we add two principles that are not discussed in the literature about the Coase theorem: a democratic principle for rights assignments and a fairness principle for the monetary payoffs distributed to the agents, that we translate into two natural properties for a solution. We show, and this is our second main result, that the nonempty core requirement is not compatible with our democratic and fairness properties. Thus, under democratic and fairness criteria, the efficiency thesis does not hold.
Introduction
The objective of this article is to demonstrate new results about the so-called "Coase theorem" George Stigler "invented" in 1966. More precisely, to understand our approach, one must recall that the "Coase theorem" is made of two theses. First, the efficiency thesis -according to which in the absence of transaction costs and if property rights are well defined, individuals will always bargain to reach an optimal allocation of resources and that corresponds to Stigler's claim that " [t] he Coase theorem thus asserts that under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal" (1966, 113) . Second, the invariance or neutrality thesis -according to which the outcome of bargaining is independent of the distribution of rights and that can also be traced back to Stigler who wrote that " [t] he manner in which the law assigns liability will not affect the relative private marginal costs of cattle and grain" (1966, 113) , or "no matter where the law places the liability for damages" (1966, 113) . 1 Thus, stricto sensu, the "Coase theorem" holds if both theses are verified simultaneously. This is what we study in this paper.
Let us start by describing the cooperative model we use in this paper. This will allow us to re-phrase the two theses and then present our results.
In our model, we consider a large class of social cost problems in which are involved a fixed and finite set of at least two victims and one polluter. As always, the activity of the latter creates damages that affect the former. More precisely, we assume that those damages can be described by nondecreasing functions on the set of activity levels of the polluter. In addition, the benefit function of the polluter is also assumed to be nondecreasing on his or her set of activity levels. Therefore, victims and polluter have conflicting interests. In order to iron those conflicts out and to solve the problem of social cost, a negotiation will take place with the objective to sign a binding agreement about how much activity the polluter will be able to undertake and how much compensation victims should receive. Now, we interpret the possibility (permission) granted to each group of agents who want to form a coalition to sign such binding agreements about the level of activity of the polluter as a right; these rights form a mapping of rights. We then assume that a coalition that signs a binding agreement always achieves efficiency: the agreement allows the coalition to select the best contract for itself. Thus, to put it in other words, a right for a coalition is here interpreted as the permission to sign efficient agreements for itself without consideration for the interest of nonmembers. We further assume that mappings of rights should satisfy natural conditions. The first one is a condition of sovereignty saying that the grand coalition is entitled to sign binding agreements with the polluter. The second one is a condition of monotonicity saying that if a coalition of agents is entitled to negotiate binding agreements, then every larger coalition inherits this right. The third property is a condition of effectivity of the law saying that if a coalition is entitled to sign efficient binding agreements for itself, then the nonmembers cannot form a coalition to prevent this coalition from exercising its rights. The last property is a condition of independence of law from the economic characteristics, saying that the right to control an issue is independent on the benefit or damages functions of its members, though the set of feasible agreements depend on these functions. From each of these mappings and the benefit and damage functions of the agents, we construct a cooperative game with transferable utility. Therefore, a solution for the class of social cost problems is a mapping formed by a mapping of rights and a monetary payoff vector for each social cost problem.
In this framework, the two theses that constitute the "Coase theorem" can be expressed as follows. The efficient thesis means that, given a social cost problem and a rights assignment, agents are able to sign an agreement that maximizes the social welfare and that no coalition of agents can rationally block this agreement. Or, to put it in the terms of cooperative game theory, the core of the cooperative game associated with the social cost problem and the rights assignment is nonempty 2 -a property that we call Core stability. And the neutrality thesis thus means that, given a social cost problem, the core of the cooperative game is nonempty whatever the rights assignment.
Then, the question of the validity of the "Coase theorem" relates to the validity of both theses simultaneously. We then show that both theses are not compatible. This is the first main result we establish. We demonstrate that the neutrality thesis is not valid in a general setting but that Core stability holds only under specific rights assignments and also characterize those rights assignments under which the core is nonempty. More precisely (see Proposition 6), we demonstrate that, for each social cost problem, Core stability is satisfied if and only if either the polluter is not liable for the damages his or her activity generates or, to the contrary, if the polluter is liable for the damages he or she can generate and the entire set victims is the only coalition that has the right to sign binding agreements with the polluter. This means that a (core) stable negotiated outcome to a problem of social cost exists but this outcome is not independent from the distribution of rights. Even if bargaining clearly does not fail -since the core is nonempty -, the "Coase theorem", stricto sensu, does not hold -the neutrality thesis is not satisfied.
Our second main result relates two additional dimensions -democracy and fairnessthat we introduce to supplement the discussion of Core stability, which is the main issue discussed in the literature. First, the democratic nature of the set of feasible multilateral negotiations is a consequence of one of the characteristics of our model, namely the possibly large number of victims affected by pollution. Indeed, in this type of situations, a victim would have the power to unilaterally veto negotiations between the polluter and the other victims if, when leaving the grand coalition, this victim would prevent or block any possibility for the others to negotiate a contract with the polluter. We claim that avoiding this kind of veto power for a victim is a minimum democratic requirement to guarantee. To this end, we introduce a condition of no veto power for a victim, that can be characterized as follows: a distribution of rights satisfies the property of No veto power for a victim if any coalition formed by the polluter and the entire set of victims except one retains its right to negotiate binding agreements. Then, second, we also take into account fairness. Clearly, victims of accidents, pollution or, more broadly, negative externalities suffer from losses while, in the meantime, the polluter earns benefits. This clearly, as it is well known, comes from the fact that the polluter does not bear the social costs that result from his or her actions. We argue that, to guarantee fairness, victims should be fully compensated for their losses. We thus introduce a property of full compensation: a solution satisfies the property of Full compensation if the payoff component of the solution is a nonnegative vector; this ensures that the victims are fully compensated for the damages and that the polluter as an interest to produce. Then, and this constitutes our second main result (Proposition 5), there is no solution on the class of social cost problems which satisfies simultaneously Full compensation, No veto power for a victim and Core stability. Complementarily, we show that the efficiency thesis is consistent with either democracy or fairness. Proposition 3 establishes that there is only one mapping of rights which allows to reconcile No veto power for a victim and Core stability; it consists in distributing rights to all coalitions in which the polluter can belong to, which amount to saying that the polluter is not considered as liable for the damages he or she can generate. And, Proposition 7 shows that there are only two mappings of rights which allow to reconcile Full compensation and Core stability. They consist in distributing rights to the full set of victims and/or the grand coalition only, meaning that unanimity is required to negotiate with the polluter.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our formal apparatus and introduce the three properties for a solution to the social cost problems. Section 3 contains our main results. Section 4 describes our contribution's relation to the existing literature on the "Coase theorem", and also clarifies a few points about our methodology.
Preliminaries

Cooperative games
Let N be a fixed and finite set of n agents. Subsets of N are called coalitions, while N is called the grand coalition. A cooperative game with transferable utility or simply a TU-game is a pair (N, v), where v is a function v : 2 N −→ R such that v(∅) = 0. For each coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) describes the worth of the coalition S when its members cooperate. The worth v(S) is thus what the members of S can accomplish together without the assistance of members of N \ S. Let V be the class of all TU-games. A payoff vector x ∈ R n of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ V is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff x i ∈ R to each agent i ∈ N . For each S ⊆ N and each x ∈ R n , denote by x(S) the sum of the payoffs x i , i ∈ S. A payoff vector is efficient with respect to (N, v) if x(N ) = v(N ); it is coalitionally rational if x(S) ≥ v(S) for every possible coalition S.
The core of (N, v) ∈ V, denoted by C(N, v), is the set, possibly empty, of efficient and coalitionally rational payoff vectors:
The interpretation of the core is that no group of agents has an incentive to split from the grand coalition N and form a smaller coalition S since they collectively receive at least as much as what they can obtain for themselves as coalition.
The so-called Bondareva-Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1962; Shapley, 1967 ) provides a sufficient and necessary condition under which the core of a TU-game is nonempty. 
Social cost problems
As mentioned in the introduction, we analyze situations in which there are one polluter and more than one potential victim affected by the activity of the polluter. This means that we consider a finite and fixed set of agents M ∪ {p} of size m + 1, where m ≥ 2. Agent p undertakes an activity at level z ∈ Z that generates a private benefit B p (z) ≥ 0. The private benefit function B p : Z −→ R is nonnegative and nondecreasing on a subset Z ⊆ R containing 0. The production of z ∈ Z by p generates also a negative externality. This external damage potentially affects each agent i ∈ M through the function D i (z). Precisely, for each i ∈ M , the external damage function D i : Z −→ R is nonnegative and nondecreasing on Z. We further assume that if p is not active, i.e. z = 0, then, for each
A social cost problem P on M ∪ {p} is described by a tuple (Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ). Let P be the class of all social cost problems P on the finite set of agents M ∪ {p}.
For each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , denote by Z * P,S , the set of socially optimal levels of production for coalition S. We have:
where 1 p (S) = 1 if S p, and 1 P (S) = 0 otherwise. For each P and each S, we assume that Z * P,S is nonempty. This requirement is satisfied, for instance, if for each P , Z is a finite set, or B p and D i , i ∈ M are continuous on a compact subset Z of R. In the sequel, for P ∈ P, and each non empty coalition S, we will use the notation z * S , instead of z * P,S , to represent an element of Z * P,S . Denote by Z * P the union of sets Z * P,S , S ⊆ M ∪ {p}, S = ∅. Note that 0 ∈ Z * P,S whenever S p.
Example 1 In many applications the benefit function is concave and the external damage functions are convex. A specific instance of such social problems is the social cost problem P where There are nonetheless differences with Bernholz's approach. The first and main one is that we do not analyze the internal functioning of coalitions and the contracts that should be signed to avoid opportunistic behaviors. We are interested in the impact of rights on pollution and on the activity of the polluter. This means that, in our analysis, "the right to control an issue" that characterizes a coalition is not the consequence of the internal structure of the coalition but is the consequence of a certain distribution of rights that is given ex ante to the agents. To put it in other words, the set of agreements that a coalition can sign is determined by the distribution of property rights. Second, we assume that the polluter p can be part of the coalition, whereas in Bernholz's model there is no polluter distinct from the victims. In our model, the population is partitioned into a polluter and a set of victims which suffer from the activity of the polluter. This assumption is of particular importance for the rest of our analysis but it is perfectly legitimate: polluters and pollutees can bargain together to determine how much pollution is acceptable and will be authorized. We do not mean to say, at this point, that the reduction of pollution will necessarily result from a bargaining involving polluter and pollutees but we leave this possibility open.
The assumption that property rights determine economic possibilities is consistent with the law and economics literature and the idea that one must take the existing legal structure -the existing distribution of rights -as a starting point for trying to envisage how to solve this very problem. As James Buchanan put it, "some structure, any structure, of well-defined rights is a necessary starting point for the potential "trades" that are required to remove the newly-emergent interdependence." (1972, 442) This is not only one ofif not the -most fundamental and well known insights of law and economics analyses, brought up by Coase (1959 Coase ( , 1960 , among others).
Formally, this means that the set of feasible levels of production that a coalition can choose is summarized by a mapping of rights φ which assigns a subset
means that S is entitled to control the activity of p either to negotiate a socially optimal level of production if S p or to prevent p from being active if S p. In case φ P (S) = ∅, coalition S is neither entitled to produce if S p nor entitled to prevent the activity of p if S p. Thus, φ assigns rights to some coalitions, which allow them to implement an optimal contract without consideration of the nonmembers of this coalition. This means that, in our framework, a right is viewed as the permission to choose some actions that reduce the set of possible outcomes in a specific way.
We assume that φ satisfies five independent and natural conditions: for each P = (Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ) ∈ P, we have:
Condition (C.1) is clear: there is no assignment of rights associated with the empty coalition.
Condition (C.2) is a condition of sovereignty. It indicates that the grand coalition M ∪ {p} has always the right to implement a socially optimal level of production for the whole society. The consequences of this condition differ, depending on the initial distribution of rights. In the case where p has the right to pollute -is not liable for the damages its activity can create -, then (C.2) means that all the victims can form a coalition with p and bargain to reach an agreement; conversely, if the victims have the right not to be polluted -that is if p is liable for the damages its activity can generate -then (C.2) means that p can try to form a coalition with all the victims and try to bargain with them. Condition (C.3) is a monotonicity condition. It is straightforward in the case of two agents, a tortfeasor and a victim. In such a situation (C.3) means that if the polluter has the right to pollute, then the coalition made of the polluter and the victim -with the objective to bargain -has also the right to control pollution; conversely, if the victim have the right to prevent pollution -by controlling the activity of p -, then the polluter must form a coalition with the victim to continue its activity. Here, we generalize it. Thus, if a coalition S has the right to control the activity of the polluter p, then every coalition T containing S is also entitled to control the activity of p. For instance, assume that p is liable for the damages generated by his or her activity. If S does not contain p and S is entitled to control the activity of p, then the members of S have the right to prevent p to pollute since p does not belong to S and is liable for the damages he or she can induce. If coalition T ⊇ S contains p, then, by virtue of monotonicity, p is now a member of a coalition that has the right to control the level of pollution. It follows that the victims in T and p will bargain to choose an optimal contract for T . Reciprocally, if p has the right to pollute, any coalition containing p has the right to bargain with p in order to control the level of pollution.
Condition (C.4) is a condition of effectivity of the law, meaning that if S has the right to implement an optimal contract without consideration of the members of (M ∪ {p}) \ S, then coalition (M ∪ {p}) \ S cannot prevent S to exercise its right. Once again, this is obvious when, as it is the case in "The Problem of Social Cost", there are only two agents: the tortfeasor and the victim cannot have the same rights simultaneously. Our condition (C.4) generalizes the case to many agents.
Then, combining (C.3) and (C.4), we obtain that if φ P (S) = Z * P,S , then φ P (T ) = ∅ for each T ⊆ (M ∪ {p}) \ S. That is: if victims have the right not to be polluted, and if a coalition S of victims is formed to which p does not belong -p ∈ (M ∪ {p}) \ S -, then p cannot have the right to pollute and the victims have the right to prevent p to pollute. In that case, the only way for p to go on with its activity is to form the coalition S ∪ {p} with the victims. The consequence is then that now p will no longer be able to be liable for the damages its activity generates. Monotonicity allows to transfer the right of the victims to the polluter. The other victims in M \ S have no right to oppose to p. They are also obliged to negotiate with the members of S ∪ {p}. Reciprocally, if p has the right to pollute, then no group of victims has the right not to be polluted; the only way for the victims to control pollution is to form a coalition with p.
Finally, (C.5) is a condition of independence of law from the economic characteristics. It indicates that the shape of B p and D i , i ∈ M , do not influence the right to control the level of pollution, even if the shape of these functions affects the set of optimal contracts. Indeed, if φ P (S) = Z * P,S , then (C.5), φ P (S) = Z * P ,S , but Z * P,S is not necessarily equal to Z * P ,S . Let Φ P be the set of all correspondences of rights satisfying (C.1), (C.2), (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5) that we can construct from P ∈ P.
Social cost TU-games
The results a coalition can achieve also depend on the behavior of the nonmembers. More precisely, there are situations in which the behavior of the nonmembers of S affect the gains of the members of S, and situations in which the behavior of the nonmembers of S do not affect the gains of the members of S. Then, the worth of a coalition S will depend on whether or not they believe the nonmembers will behave in a way that will affect them. This represents a large number of cases. We propose to restrict our attention to the so-called pessimistic (expectation) rule. This rule, inspired by Aumann (1967) and discussed by Hart and Kurz (1983) , assume that the members of any coalition S believe or expect that nonmembers S will from the partition which minimizes the worth of S. As noted by Bloch and van Nouweland (2014) , the pessimistic rule is most in line with the idea that a coalition should consider the worth that it can guarantee itself independent of the behavior of nonmembers of S -an idea that underlines the very definition of a TU-game. From this assumption, the TU-game (M ∪ {p}, v φ P ) is defined as:
Several comments are in order. If S p and φ P (S) = ∅, then the members of S has the right to negotiate an optimal production level in Z * S,P . By (C.3) and (C.4), for each T ⊆ M \S, it holds that φ P (T ) = ∅. So, whatever the partition of M \ S, coalition S can guarantee
If S p and φ P ((M ∪ {p}) \ S) = ∅, then the polluter p does not cooperate with the members of coalition S, and there is at least one coalition in (M ∪ {p}) \ S including p which can cooperate with the polluter to negotiate an optimal level of production for itself. Under the pessimistic rule, agents in S expect that nonmembers of S will form the partition which minimizes the worth of S. Because every coalition of the partition not containing p has no impact on the worth S, the maximal impact of pollution caused by the nonmembers of S is determined by the coalition T p, T ⊆ (M ∪ {p}) \ S, such that φ P (T ) = ∅ and which minimizes the worth of S, i.e.
Note that this coalition T is necessarily minimal (with respect to set inclusion) among the coalitions in (M ∪{p})\S which have the right to negotiate an optimal level of production. In all other cases, either p does not belong to S and φ P ((M ∪{p})\S) = ∅, or p belongs to S and φ P (S) = ∅. In both situations p has not the right to pollute or to contract an optimal level of production with some victims, and so no activity is undertaken. Therefore, the worth of S is equal to zero.
Solutions and properties for a solution
A solution to a class of problems of social cost is a pair formed by a mapping of rights and payoff vectors.
Formally, a (singled-valued) solution on P is a function F defined on P which assigns a mapping of rights and a payoff vector F (P ) = (φ P , x P ) ∈ Φ P × R M ∪{p} to each social cost problem P ∈ P. The rights assignment part of the solution has been discussed above. Regarding the "monetary" part of the solution, i.e. the payoff vector x P , the interpretation is as follows. First, x P,i , i ∈ M , represents the quantity of money received by the victim i after having suffered a damage represented by D i and having received a transfer from p. Second, x P,p represents what p obtains after having produced a certain quantity of goods, received a certain benefit B p , and transferred a certain amount to the victim. If x P,i ≥ 0 for i ∈ M , then this means that i has been integrally compensated for the activity of p, and x P,p ≥ 0 means that after having produced at a certain level for a benefit represented by B p , and proceeded to the transfers, p obtains a surplus (otherwise, p will not produce).
We now introduce three properties for a solution F on P. The first one is a propriety of efficiency and stability captured by the core. It indicates that, for each social cost problem P , acceptable payoff vectors are those who belong to the core of the TU-game (M ∪ {p}, v φ P ). Thus, this property implies that, for each social cost problem, the core of the corresponding TU-game must be nonempty.
Core stability A solution F satisfies Core stability on P if, for each P ∈ P, F (P ) = (φ P , x P ) is such that x P ∈ C(M ∪ {p}, v φ P ).
The second property contains a principle of democracy, which is captured by the idea that no victim can veto the negotiations between the rest of the victims and the polluter. It indicates that if a victim leaves the grand coalition, which is sovereign by hypothesis, the rest of the victims and the polluter retain their right to negotiate binding agreements. This property echoes the property of No veto power introduced by Maskin (1999) 
Let us note that, by condition (C.4), No veto power for a victim implies that each victim, individually, has no right to oppose to other coalitions: for i ∈ M , φ P ({i}) = ∅.
The last property reflects a principle of fairness that bears on the amount of compensation that victims receive. Here, fairness is captured by the idea that each victim should be fully compensated for the damages the polluter generates by his or her activities, and that the latter earns, having received a certain benefit and transferred a certain amount of money to each victim, a nonnegative payoff.
Full compensation A solution F satisfies Full compensation on P if, for each P ∈ P, F (P ) = (φ P , x P ) is such that x P ≥ (0, . . . , 0).
Results
We begin by proving that when the polluter is not liable for the externalities he or she generates, the core of the TU-game constructed from this mapping of rights and defined as in (3) is nonempty whatever the social cost problem. So, let us define, for each social cost problem P = (Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ) ∈ P, the mapping of rights φ d P ∈ Φ P as follows:
Each φ d P indicates that the polluter p is not liable for the pollution damages and so has the right to select an optimal level of production in Z * P,{p} . By the monotonicity condition (C.3), every coalition of victims S containing the polluter p has also the right to select an optimal level of production in Z * P,S , i.e. φ P (S) = Z * P,S for each S p. By condition (C.4), if S p, then S is not entitled to prevent the polluter p to produce, which means that p can exercise his or her right to pollute. All in all, φ d P says that p can veto any coalition of victims in the sense that if p leaves such a coalition, the latter will suffer the maximal damages. From (3), for each social cost problem P = (Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ) ∈ P, the TU-game (M ∪ {p}, v φ p P ) rewrites as:
To prove Proposition 2 we need an intermediary result.
Lemma 1 Let λ ∈ B(N ) be a balanced map on the agent set N containing at least two elements. Consider any two distinct agents i and j in N . It holds that:
Proof. Take λ, i and j as hypothesized. We have:
and so
as desired.
We are now in position to prove Proposition 2.
Proof. Pick any P ∈ P. By the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Proposition 1), it suffices to prove that, for each balanced map λ ∈ B(M ∪ {p}), it holds that:
is given by (4). So, pick any balanced map λ ∈ B(M ∪ {p}). By definition of (M ∪ {p}, v φ d P ), we have:
Consider the polluter p and any victim i ∈ M . By Lemma 1, we have:
Therefore, equality (5) can be rewritten as:
. Therefore, from equality (6), we obtain:
where the third equality comes from the fact that, by definition of a balanced map, S p λ(S) = 1. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Define the set of solutions F d as follows:
Proposition 2 helps to show that the only way to obtain a solution satisfying Core stability and No veto power for a victim is to pick a solution in F d .
Proposition 3
The solutions in F d are the only solutions on P satisfying Core stability and No veto power for a victim.
Proof. By Proposition 2, To this end, pick any P = (M ∪{p}, Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ) ∈ P, and any φ P ∈ Φ P \{φ d P }. Among the elements of Φ P \ {φ d } only two types of mappings of rights can be used to construct a solution F satisfying No veto power for a victim. To show this point, consider the following two remaining and exclusive cases.
(a) Assume that φ P ({i}) = Z * P,{i} for some victim i ∈ M . By (C.4), φ P ((M ∪ {p}) \ {i})) = ∅. Therefore, any solution F constructed from such a correspondence of rights will violate No veto power for a victim.
(b) Assume φ P ({i}) = ∅ for each victim i ∈ M . Note that φ P ({p}) = Z * P,{p} is not possible since otherwise φ P = φ d P . So, φ P ({p}) = ∅ as well. If, for some i ∈ M , φ P (M ∪ {p} \ {i}) = ∅, then the corresponding solution F will violate No veto power for a victim. Thus, we must have φ P ((M ∪ {p}) \ {i}) = Z * P,(M ∪{p})\{i} for each i ∈ M . At this step, we conclude that either φ P (M ) = Z * P,M or φ P (M ) = ∅ are possible.
From (a) and (b), conclude that φ is either of the form φ P ({i}) = ∅ for each i ∈ M ∪{p} and φ P (M ) = ∅ or of the form φ P ({i}) = ∅ for each i ∈ M ∪ {p}, and φ P (M ) = Z * P,M . Next, consider the social cost problemP given in Example 1, and any such above mentioned mappings of rights φP . The worth of the grand coalition and the worth of each coalition of size m in (M ∪ {p}, v φP ) are given by: Proposition 3 states that the efficiency thesis is valid even if one imposes the requirement that no victim has the right to veto the rest of the society. But, it also indicates that under this democratic requirement, there is only one possible rights assignment compatible with the efficiency thesis. Under this assignment, the polluter is not liable for the damages his or her activity generates. This implies that, even if one restricts the rights assignments to those which satisfy No veto power for a victim, the neutrality thesis fails to be true. It should be noted that Proposition 3 continues to be true if one restricts the domain of social cost problems to the subset of instances where the benefit functions are concave and the damage functions are convex. To see this, it suffices to note that Proposition 2 remains true on this subdomain and the Example 1 used in the Proposition 3 to prove the emptiness of the core belongs to this subdomain. So, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Assume that the domain of social cost problems under consideration is restricted to instances where the benefit functions are concave and the damage functions are convex. Then, the solutions in F d are the only solutions on this subdomain satisfying Core stability and No veto power for a victim.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that under No veto power for a victim there is no solution satisfiying Full compensation, from which we conclude that there is no stable, democratic and fair solutions in our sense for the social cost problems. These two facts are collected in the following propositions.
Proposition 4 Each solution F ∈ F d violates Full compensation.
Proof. Pick any F ∈ F d and any P ∈ P. By (4) the corresponding TU-game (M ∪{p}, v φ d ) is such that:
Combining the core constraints on coalitions {p} and M ∪ {p} with the latter inequality, yields:
For such a P , we have:
which is not compatible with Full compensation.
Combining Proposition 3 with Proposition 4, we obtain the following impossibility result.
Proposition 5
There is no solution on P satisfying Core stability, No veto power for a victim and Full compensation.
From Proposition 5, the efficiency thesis is no longer true in presence of Full compensation and No veto power for a victim. From Proposition 3, we know that the neutrality thesis does not hold. Therefore, it remains to characterize the set of solutions satisfying Core stability only, or equivalently, the set of rights assignments under which the efficiency thesis holds. Note that this constitutes the main question studied in the cooperative game theory literature related to the "Coase theorem". So far, and to the best of our knowledge, this question has not received a clear answer. We fill up this gap in Proposition 6 below by showing that there are only two types of rights assignment compatible with Core stability: either the polluter is not liable for his or her activity, or he or she is liable and negotiations over a pollution level require unanimity. To show this impossibility result, we need a definition.
For each P = (Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ) ∈ P, define the (two) mappings of rights φ u P ∈ Φ P as follows:
The mappings of rights φ u P indicate that the polluter p needs the agreement of the set of victims M to produce at some activity level, meaning that an agreement requires unanimity. Denote by Φ u P these two mappings of rights. Next, let us introduce the set of solutions F u as follows:
For each P ∈ P, and whatever the value of φ u P (M ), (M ∪ {p}, v φ u P ) is such that:
It follows that each F ∈ F u satisfies Core stability, Full compensation, but violates No veto power for a victim. Consequently, F u ∩ F d = ∅, and each F in F u ∪ F d satisfies Core stability. The following result establishes that F u ∪ F d is the unique set of solutions satisfying Core stability.
Proposition 6
The solutions in F u ∪ F d are the only solutions on P satisfying Core stability.
Proof. As noted above, F u ∪ F d satisfies Core stability. To prove that F u ∪ F d is the largest set solutions satisfying Core stability, take any F on P which satisfies Core stability but violates No veto power for a victim. To show: F ∈ F u . By Proposition 3, F ∈ F d . So, there is P = (M ∪ {p}, Z, B p , (D i ) i∈M ) ∈ P for which F (P ) = (φ P , x P ) is such that φ P ((M ∪ {p}) \ {i}) = ∅ for at least one i ∈ M . There are two cases to consider.
(a) φ P ((M ∪ {p}) \ {i}) = ∅ for each i ∈ M . By condition (C.3), φ P (S) = ∅ for each S p, S = M ∪ {p}. Next, assume that there is S M such that φ P (S) = Z * P,S . This means that there is i ∈ M such that S ⊆ M \ {i} ⊆ (M ∪ {p}) \ {i}. Applying (C.3), φ P (S) = Z * P,S implies φ P ((M ∪ {p}) \ {i}) = Z * P,(M ∪{p})\{i} , a contradiction. Therefore, we necessarily have, for each S M , φ P (S) = ∅. It follows that φ P ∈ Φ u P . By definition of a solution F , for each P ∈ P \ {P }, we have φ P (S) = ∅ if and only
Define by I and J the following nonempty subsets of agents:
By condition (C.5), the sets I and J do not depend on P . For the rest of the proof assume, without loss of generality, that 2 ∈ I and 1 ∈ J. Consider the social problem
For the grand coalition, coalition M , and coalitions of size m containing p, we have:
Take the balanced map λ ∈ B(M ∪ {p}) given by:
We have:
By the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Proposition 1), if
then the social cost TU-game (M ∪{p}, v φ P ) has an empty core. Because |J| ∈ {1, . . . , m− 1},
Therefore, to show that the core of the above social cost TU-game is empty whatever the value taken by |J|, that is whatever the number of victims without veto power, it is enough to verify that:
which is a routine exercice left to the reader. From (a) and (b), we conclude that if F on P satisfies Core stability but violates No veto power for a victim, then F ∈ F u . Therefore, F d ∪F u is the largest subclass of solutions satisfying Core stability, as desired.
As for Proposition 3, it is easy to notice that Proposition 6 continues to hold if one restricts the domain to instances where the benefit functions are concave and the damage functions are convex.
Corollary 2 Assume that the domain of social cost problems under consideration is restricted to instances where the benefit functions are concave and the damage functions are convex. Then, the solutions in F d ∪ F u are the only solutions on this subdomain satisfying Core stability.
By Proposition 4, every solution in F d violates Full compensation. Combining Proposition 4 with Proposition 6, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7
The solutions in F u are the only solutions on P satisfying Core stability and Full compensation.
Proposition 7 establishes that the efficiency thesis is valid even if one imposes the requirement that each victim is compensated for the damages they suffer from the activity of the polluter. But, by Proposition 6 and the fact that the solutions in F u satisfy Full compensation, there is only one possible right assignment compatible with the efficiency thesis.
Related literature and complementary explanations
4.1. Methodology: the axiomatic approach From the cooperative game theory viewpoint, the question of the validity of the "Coase theorem" relates mainly to the nonemptiness of the core of a game in which there are negative externalities and a problem of social cost. To be more precise, the question amounts to asking: is there one or many distribution of rights under which the core is nonempty?
One of the older works on the core and externalities is maybe the article by Shapley and Shubik (1969) who studied the situation where a set of polluters decide on where to dump their garbage. The worth a coalition is defined by the total damages that the members suffer from the nonmembers if the latter decide to dump their garbage in the members' backyards. Therefore, and contrary to our model, here agents are all potential polluters and pollute each other. The efficient coalition is the grand coalition in which each member dump is garbage in his or her backyard. Except in the case of two agents, Shapley and Shubik showed that this game has an empty core. Ambec and Kervinio (2016) reconsidered this problem with a spatial model externalities and proposed a general index for testing whether the core of the game is empty or not.
Still in the cooperative approach, Aivazian and Callen (1981) constructed a cooperative game in which there are two polluting firms and one victim and demonstrate that the core of this game is nonempty when the two polluters are liable for the damages generated by their activity. Thus, in this case, they claimed that the "Coase theorem" holds and that a stable and efficient allocation of resources can be reached though a bargaining process. But, the core of the game is empty when the polluters are not liable, which means that each efficient allocation can be blocked by a coalition, and so firms can endlessly negotiate. None of the two theses that form the "Coase theorem" are verified. The theorem "breaks down did they conclude (see also Aivazen, Callen et Lipnowsky, 1987; Aivazen and Callen, 2003; Aivazian, Callen and McCracken, 2009 )" 3 . In other words, Aivazian and Callen showed -through an example and without acknowledging it -that one cannot have the efficiency and the neutrality theses satisfied at the same time. This is also what we demonstrate by relying on an axiomatic study.
Indeed, beyond the fact that we consider one polluter and several victims, which, by the way, allows to avoid the difficulty put forward by Magnan de Bornier (see footnote 3), our approach differs from the above mentioned works in that we provide an axiomatic study of the social cost problems. As explained by Thomson (2001) , the axiomatic study begins with the specification of the domain of the social cost problems, and the formulation of a list of desirable properties, called also axioms, of solutions for the domain. It ends with a description of the classes of solutions satisfying various combinations of the properties. It should also offer, among other things, a discussion of whether plausible alternative specifications of the domain would affect the conclusions. This is precisely that we do in this article. We specify a large class of social cost problems with monotonic benefit and damage functions. We design desirable properties for a solution. Each of these properties incorporates a stability (Core stability), a democratic (No veto power for a victim) or a fairness (Full compensation) principle. Then, Proposition 3, Proposition 5, Proposition 6, and Proposition 7 characterize the solutions satisfying various combinations of these properties. The proof of these propositions reveals that certain (im)possibility results continue to hold when we restrict the domain to the social cost problems where the benefit functions are concave and the damages functions are convex.
By analyzing a large class of social cost problems from the axiomatic point of view, we also depart from Coase's original approach in "The Problem of Social Cost", who mainly studies stylized examples, and are closer to what Calabresi did (1961 Calabresi did ( , 1965 . On these differences, we refer the reader to Medema (2014) . At last, we think that the axiomatic method is relevant for law and economics by exposing the possible logical incompatibility between economic and legal principles.
Transaction costs
Our article is not related to the cooperative game theoretical literature on the positive or zero transaction costs and the "Coase theorem", which represents another particularly important aspect in any discussion of the "Coase theorem" 4 . In our model, we assume, as most of the literature does, that there are no transaction costs. To understand the legitimacy of this assumption, one must go back to the difference between the "Coase theorem" and "The Problem of Social Cost".
As it is clear from the quotations recalled in the introduction, Stigler did not formally and explicitly use the assumption of zero transaction costs in his formulation of the "Coase theorem" but his reference to "perfect competition" indicates that he was assuming a world without frictions. Coase, for his part, explicitly introduced this 'heroic" (McKean, 1970, 31) assumption in "The Problem of Social Cost". However, Coase also and very rapidlyafter one third of the paper -dismissed this assumption as unrealistic: "the assumption . . . that there were no costs involved in carrying out market transactions is, of course, a very unrealistic assumption" (Coase, 1960, 15) . Indeed, despite what the literature has assumed afterwards, a large part of Coase's paper was devoted to an analysis of situations in which there are transaction costs. The reason was straightforward: to Coase, "[w]e do not do well to devote ourselves to a detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs" (Coase, 1981, 187) or "[i]t would not seem worthwhile to spend much time investigating the properties of such a world" (Coase, 1988, 15) . It could be interesting but as "a preliminary" (1988, 15) that would precede the "development of an analytical system capable of tackling the problems posed by the real world of positive transaction costs" (1988, 15) , which was the real objective pursued by Coase and that has been missed or forgotten by commentators. It may be viewed as "surprising how little systematic followup has been to Coase's own call for examining positive transaction costs" (Robson and Skaperdas, 2008, 110) . However, this is perfectly consistent with Stigler's version of the "Coase theorem". This is the first reason that leads us to make this assumption.
The second justification is that the cooperative game literature that exists on positive vs. zero transaction costs has reached unambiguous but contradictory conclusions. For their part, Aivazian and Callen, in their original paper, assumed that transaction costs are nil. This was precisely what Coase replied to them: in the real world, transaction costs are positive and so firms cannot negotiate endlessly; they are bound by contracts, that they cannot break at will. Later, Aivazian and Callen (2003) took transaction costs in their analysis, and concluding that this does not modify their result -the core remains empty -but "exacerbate" it (2003, 296). For their part, Guzzini and Palestrini (2009) were less affirmative. They introduced another type of friction and showed that in the Aivazian-Callen's example the core is non empty. But they added that their result "does not invalidate the Aivazian-Callen's analysis: it just shows that by introducing this type of friction in the bargain process, the Coase argumentation (1981) may be supported [...] we conclude by claiming again that if, in one hand [transaction costs] seem to mitigate the empty core, on the other hand, we cannot say that the efficient outcome will be reached for sure" (7). More recently, Robson (2014) also concluded that transaction costs can sometimes mitigate the instability problem posed by an empty core. In a three-agent situations, it is always possible, as Robson demonstrated, to find a set of transaction costs which, when introduced into a frictionless bargaining situation, will cause an empty core to become nonempty.
In view of these inconclusive results, we have chosen to propose one more of one of those analyses that Coase viewed as preliminary steps towards more realistic analyses and to assume away transaction costs.
Neutrality of rights
This reasoning about transaction costs has particularly important consequences in terms of rights.
Indeed, as it has been emphasized earlier, the "Coase theorem" also implies that the law has no impact on economic activities. More precisely, the complementarity of the two theses implies that the neutrality thesis holds only when there are no transaction costs. At least, this is what Stigler -and the literature on the "Coase theorem" after him -argued. This is what Chipman and Tian (2012) demonstrated, in a recent article, with their "Coase neutrality theorem". Following in the footsteps of Hurwicz (1995) , they provided a necessary and sufficient condition under which the neutrality thesis holds in a competitive setting with two commodities (money and pollution) and two price-taker agents.
And, of course, when there are transaction costs, there is no neutrality of the law. Legal rules -and how are assigned rights -do matter.
This is exactly what Coase argued. He was interested in analyzing situations in which there are transaction costs because he was interested in showing that the law matters and in understanding how various institutions -including the market -perform when there are positive transaction costs, which happens all the time; he was interested to know whether or not one can rely on the pricing system in cases in which there are transaction costs and, accordingly, if other institutional arrangements are required to complement or replace the market. In other words, for Coase, the law is certainly not neutral for the efficiency of the allocation of resources. It affects transactions and exchanges and the object of economics should indeed be to understand the nature of such impact.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the situation is more complex: even when there are no transaction costs, law matters and the distribution of rights affects the outcome of a negotiation between agents to remove an externality; even when there are no transaction costs, the neutrality thesis does not hold. This negative result continues to be true when one imposes a democratic principle to rights assignments, i.e. when one reduces the feasible set of rights assignments.
Enforcement
"Enforcement" is another aspect that is discussed -even if not so frequently -in the literature about the "Coase theorem", to which we must say a few words. Actually, enforcement is a twofold problem. First, there is no guarantee that a polluter is going to respect the agreement that bargaining has allowed to reach. This issue could very well have been but was not discussed in the frame of Coase's model, with two players only. The reason was probably that, as Robson and Skaperdas (2008, 2) noted, it is presupposed that there exists a legal system that guarantee a costless enforcement of agreements reached by the parties. But, as Robson and Skaperdas showed, when enforcement is costly and because the probability to win a trial is always lower than 1, the "Coase theorem" does not hold. In this article, we do not take into account the problems that can be caused by this kind of enforcement: the choice the activity level of the polluter is made by bargaining, and it is assumed that the polluter will respect what has been agreed on. The reason is that our primary focus is not on how agents arrive at an efficient contract but what are the efficient contracts which satisfy desirable properties.
Although we agree that these behaviors are important and represent a possible threat to the existence of a negotiated solution to a problem of social cost, we do not take them explicitly into account since, in a cooperative setting, contracts are binding and agent cannot exploit their strategic power. Our primary purpose is to demonstrate that, when there are many victims and one polluters, under certain distributions of rights, the core of a cooperative game associated with a social cost problem is nonempty, but that this result is incompatible with fairness and democratic requirements. The analysis of free riding behaviors in a noncooperative framework is well studied in the recent article by Ellingsen and Paltseva (2016) . We also refer the reader to Parisi (2003) , and Luppi and Parisi (2012) who completed the analysis of the role of enforcement institutions.
Conclusion
The "Coase theorem" has received a lot of attention among economists, but there are still no completely definitive conclusions about its validity. In this paper, we propose new results about whether or not the theorem holds. Certainly, our results are partial -limited to the case of one polluter and many victims and we do not take transaction costs into account. These are clearly the next steps that should be taken. But we nonetheless put forward important results.
We show that the two theses, efficiency and neutrality, upon which the theorem rests cannot be satisfied at the same time: the efficiency thesis can be satisfied but under only two specific assignment of rights. This result confirms and complements the results reached in the literature about the core and the Coase theorem -since we analyze a different situation and we use a more general approach than the one usually used. However, and this is also important, if there were only two agents -a polluter and a victim -as in Coase's original article, the set of mappings of rights reduces to the mappings φ u and φ d . It could then easily be shown that, in that case, the core is nonempty whatever the rights assignment. Therefore, the efficiency and the neutrality theses hold in the two agents case.
In addition, we also enrich this literature by adding an impossibility result. We show that Core stability cannot be satisfied under democratic (no veto power for a victim) and fairness (full compensation of victims) constraints; even if Core stability is compatible with fairness (full compensation of victims). This means that efficiency could be satisfied -an agreement could be signed by the polluter and the victims to reach an optimal allocation of resources -but at the expense of, either democracy or fairness.
